Recognition of phenomenological tendencies in several dozen disciplines beyond philosophy raises the question of how phenomenology in general might be defined prior to specification in terms of the agendas of the particular disciplines. After an attempt at an answer to this question, some observations concerning the possible benefits of interdisciplinary encounters, especially for philosophical phenomenology, are offered.
Introduction
To judge by the suffixes of the e-mail addresses of the subscribers to the Newsletter of Phenomenology, there are at least 3,750 self-identified phenomenologists alive today in over 50 countries.
1 Recent efforts to understand the combinations of these phenomenologists across the planet have thus far identified over 180 local phenomenological organizations, including one in Siberia, and considerable progress has been made to include these organizations in the world-wide Organization of Phenomenological Organizations, as well as to establish five regional organizations for them. Of these, the Circulo LatinoAmericano de Fenomenologia was the first, and the fifth, the Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American Phenomenologists, has just been founded.
There is reason to believe, however, that what has thus come together in a loose and bottom-up way still chiefly comprises phenomenological philosophers, while the approximately three dozen disciplines beyond philosophy which include self-identified phenomenologists are underrepresented.
2 It would seem probable, then, that non-philosophical phenomenologists will in coming years considerably increase the counts just offered of colleagues and organizations in our tradition. Efforts prominent in East Asia are already fostering this trend.
There is also reason to believe that relations between phenomenology and philosophy could benefit from more contact with phenomenology in disciplines beyond philosophy, and hence to ask how this might
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An attempt is made in what follows to answer this second question before the first.
What is Phenomenology?
This question has been struggled with ever since Edmund Husserl named his effort more than a century ago. Most attempts to answer it have come from philosophers and focus on philosophical phenomenology, but it is now also a regular question in disciplines beyond philosophy, and the answer may be different if one seeks to cover all the disciplines within our multidisciplinary tradition. There is need for a generic answer that can be specified according to the discipline. Having pondered this issue for some time, let me offer a "stratified answer" by which I go to deeper levels according to how strong the interest of my interlocutor is.
When I am asked these days what phenomenology is, I first explain that Husserl thought he was founding or re-founding first philosophy as a strict science and hence gave it a name ending in "-ology" as would be appropriate for a science, but that if one were an intellectual historian one might well speak of something like "reflective descriptivism" and include similar positions, such as those of Bergson, Dilthey and the early James. Then I suggest that it is better to characterize the Husserlian effort by its approach rather than by its results, and hence report that I like most simply to call it "reflective analysis" (Embree, 2003 (Embree, , 2006 . If this answer does not satisfy, I go down to deeper levels of definition.
To characterize the approach shared in disciplines beyond philosophy as well as in phenomenological philosophy, I then propose three defining characteristics by saying that this approach is, in essence, (a) reflective, (b) descriptive, and (c) cultureappreciative. But I usually still need to go deeper.
I describe the reflectiveness of phenomenology as involving the observation in oneself and one's groups, and in others and their groups, of encounterings of things, things-as-encountered, and also of the collective and individual subjects who encounter things. (I quickly clarify that I use "thing" to refer to anything at all and not merely material objects.) Then I explain that I prefer words based on the verb "to encounter", because mention of "encountering" nicely raises the question of what is encountered, and because it is easier (at least in English) to recognize that encounterings concretely include, in addition to experiencings, the components best called believings, valuings, and willings. These thetic or positional components can be positive, negative or neutral in modality, and moreover, correlatively, the things-asencountered -which can be ideal as well as real and, if real, then spatio-temporal as well as purely temporal -include appearances, manners of givenness, and intrinsic and extrinsic positive, negative and neutral belief characteristics, values and uses. Reflective observation, which is a skill that needs to be cultivated, discloses a great deal that this taxonomy only begins to sort out.
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As for how phenomenology is descriptive, I say that description involves the mental transition from the grasping of things reflectively or unreflectively to words naming and characterizing them, and add that, when the thing from which one thus proceeds is a speech or a text, it is appropriate to speak of interpretation, but then interpretation is a species of description in my broad signification. Furthermore, descriptions can be of universal essences, concepts, and both fictively and seriously experienced real things. Moreover, description is prior to explanation, knowing what something is being necessary for knowing why something is. Finally, descriptions invite the reader or hearer to look for herself to see whether the things described are as described and, if not, to correct or improve the descriptions and thus to advance the investigation.
What I have said thus far is hardly new for phenomenologists, but some may be intrigued by my assertion that phenomenology is culture-appreciative. I came to recognize the importance of this property by asking what it is that phenomenology in all of the disciplines that I know anything about is opposed to. That contrasting position is called "naturalism", "objectivism" or "positivism." Husserl preferred "objectivism", but this expression has not become widely accepted. While positivism is a movement in theory of social science and philosophy that goes back over 150 years and holds that all knowledge should be, or be modelled on, naturalistic science, "naturalism" seems to convey the broadest concept, one that extends beyond science into a spreading worldview that some consider a major source of today's ecological crisis. Let me insert that a suggestion of Geoffrey Lloyd (1991) deserves consideration. This is the suggestion that the West is different from other cultures because, in effect, it learned early on to abstract from culture and mind in order to focus on physical nature. With nature defined, one can develop not only naturalistic science but also naturalistic-scientific technology and ever more power over practically everything. But, of course, if the abstraction from spirit is the source of naturalism, and if one goes on to consider the resultthat is, nature -to be concrete, which defines naturalism, then the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is committed, because the lifeworld is originally and concretely not only natural but also socio-cultural.
Phenomenologists are currently quite interested in how we encounter others and are encountered by them, so sociality is now receiving its due attention.
As for how the world is originally cultural, however, I do not believe this has received the attention in our tradition that it deserves. I believe that the world is cultural in two ways. On the higher level there are, as Alfred Schütz has shown, conceptual constructs of things in common sense that we chiefly receive from contemporaries and predecessors through ordinary language. But, under the stratum of language, there is a subconceptual stratum that I call "basic culture" (Embree, 2008a) . On this deeper level, reflection can disclose encounterings, and the values and uses of things-as-encountered, whether or not these are grasped in commonsense constructs, and these matters of basic culture are also chiefly learned from and shared with individual and collective others. It may be that the original cultural character of all things is often mistakenly overlooked because there is so much variety to it.
That the world is socio-cultural seems more appreciated in the human, socio-historical, or, best, the cultural sciences than in phenomenological philosophy thus far. I prefer to call them cultural sciences also because, as Gurwitsch and MerleauPonty already knew in the 1930s, chimpanzees have basic culture (Embree, 2008b) . This is culture as often focused on in ethnology or cultural anthropology, but it is distinctively present in the subject matters of all of the cultural disciplines if one looks carefully (Embree, 1994 (Embree, 1992 (Embree, , 1996 .
I hope I have said enough to clarify how I believe phenomenology in general is not only reflective and descriptive, but also culture-appreciative. Let me now turn to the topic of interdisciplinarity.
Phenomenology Can Be More Interdisciplinary
There seems a disciplinary imbalance within our tradition. Colleagues in other disciplines continue to learn much from philosophical phenomenology, and philosophers must be proud of that, but they do not benefit in return nearly as much as they might.
Research is interdisciplinary when convergent research in one or more other disciplines is taken quite seriously.
The question of traditions becoming more interdisciplinary has tended to be approached beginning from the disciplines and then considering tendencies, orientations or schools of thought, such as phenomenology, as at best secondary. After all, where our professional identities are concerned, most of us are philosophers, economists, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists and so forth first and Marxists, positivists, phenomenologists and so forth only second. The structures of academic institutions and degree programmes support this approach. And we have had disciplinary differences since Aristotle and the seven liberal arts of the Middle Ages. 4 But here I shall ignore other traditions such as Marxism and positivism and focus specifically on how, within our own huge phenomenological tradition, there are disciplinary differences that can be dealt with for maximum benefit to all involved. 4 The phenomenologist Joseph Kockelmans (1979) offered this definition of "discipline" late in the 20th Century: "A branch of learning or a field of study characterized as a body of intersubjectively accepted knowledge pertaining to a well-defined realm of entities, systematically established on the basis of generally accepted principles with the help of methodological rules or procedures, e.g., mathematics, chemistry, history." It deserves mention that Kockelmans draws, among much else, on the work on interdisciplinarity of the phenomenologist Georges Gusdorf, author of "Interdisciplinaire (Connaissance)" in the Encyclopaedia Universalis . It was in that connection that I began more clearly to recognize not only how, in the course of a century, our tradition had spread across the planet, but also how it was pursued in over a score of nonphilosophical disciplines, namely architecture, behavioural geography, cognitive science, communicology, dance, ecology, economics, education, ethnic studies, ethnology, film, hermeneutics, literature, music, nursing, political science, psychiatry, psychology, religion, social geography, sociology, and theatre. I kept finding more and more disciplines beyond philosophy with phenomenological tendencies, if not schools of thought, within them! Since then I have, of course, identified more and more such disciplines.
In the introduction to our encyclopaedia, Jiten Mohanty and I sketched the evolution of the phenomenological agenda -that is, how issues were added to it decade by decade, such as gender by Edith Stein in the 1920s (Stein, 1996) and generational difference by Simone de Beauvoir in 1970 (Beauvoir, 1989) . Re-reading that introduction in preparation for the present essay, however, I self-critically find it rather philosophy-centric and hence must say that at that time I still had not fully appreciated how multidisciplinary our tradition has long been. But I am still proud enough in this respect of the opening paragraph of our introduction to quote it now:
Although anticipations can be found in the works of Henri Bergson, Franz Brentano, Wilhelm Dilthey, William James, and others, the phenomenological movement began in the reflections of Edmund Husserl during the mid-1890s and is thus more than a century old. It spread from Germany to Japan, Russia, and Spain and also from philosophy to psychiatry before World War I; to Australia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Flanders, Poland, and the United States and to education, music, and religion during the 1920s; and to Czechoslovakia, Italy, Korea, and Yugoslavia and to architecture, literature, and theatre during the 1930s. Phenomenology then spread to Portugal, Scandinavia, and South Africa, and also to ethnic studies, feminism, film, and political theory soon after World War II; then to Canada, China, and India and to dance, The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg (South Africa) and Edith Cowan University's Faculty of Regional Professional Studies (Australia), published in association with NISC (Pty) Ltd. It can be found at www.ipjp.org This work is licensed to the publisher under the Creative Commons Attributions License 3.0 geography, law, and psychology in the 1960s and 1970s; and finally to Great Britain and also to ecology, ethnology, and nursing in the 1980s and 1990s. Given its spread to other disciplines as well as across the planet, phenomenology is arguably the major philosophical movement of the 20th Century. (Embree, 1997, p 
A Final Caution
Having now not only thought about phenomenology as a tradition that has become ever increasingly multidisciplinary during little over a century, but having encountered some phenomenology as actually done in disciplines beyond philosophy, let me offer some final remarks to fellow phenomenologists in philosophy. To begin with, I urge not just reading work by colleagues in disciplines beyond philosophy, but also hearing their presentations and discussing their work with them. It can be very encouraging when colleagues in different disciplines meet and find they have convergent practical as well as theoretical interests. (Discovering that an associate dean in our nursing school is a phenomenologist has already improved enrolments in one of my courses!)
Interdisciplinary encountering is like foreign traveloften initially difficult and uncomfortable, with many strange things and unexpected developments, even a type of culture shock is possible, but ultimately it is rewarding. Philosophers can become irritated by misused terminology and deeply misunderstood methods used by non-philosophical colleagues. Often, I must confess, I find a "disciplinary superiority complex", as it might be called, actually in myself as well as in others. Is it not easy, however, to imagine that an economist similarly believes that her discipline addresses the most important aspect of social life, or that a psychologist or sociologist believes that hers does?
If one's superiority complex is overt, it can be called "disciplinary arrogance", something I have seen in phenomenological philosophers who look down on social scientists, nurses, and so forth. Such philosophical colleagues would do well, however, to consider how ridiculous our philosophical preoccupations with such things as ultimate grounding, being qua being, whether the world exists, why there is something rather than nothing, transcendental intersubjectivity, and so forth, may possibly appear to colleagues in disciplines beyond philosophy, especially the practical ones! Being "discipline-centric" seems inevitable and is probably not a bad thing where the development of specialized knowledge and skill are concerned. But, just as with class, ethnicity, gender and nationality, where there are also tendencies toward superiority complexes and
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